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Abstract: In this note we consider linear stationary feedback Nash equi-
libria of the scalar linear-quadratic diﬀerential game. The planning horizon
considered is assumed to be inﬁnite. We present both necessary and suﬃcient
conditions on the system parameters for existence of a unique solution of the
associated algebraic Riccati equations (ARE) that stabilizes the closed-loop
system. For the case of more solutions, singleton-valued reﬁnements of the
equilibrium concept are studied.
Keywords: Linear quadratic games, feedback Nash equilibrium, solvabil-
ity conditions, Riccati equations
1I. Problem statement
In this note we consider the problem where two parties (henceforth called
players) try to minimize their individual quadratic performance criterion.
Each player controls a diﬀerent set of inputs to a single system. The system
is described by the following diﬀerential equation
˙ x = ax + b1u1 + b2u2, x(0) = x0. (1)
Here x is the state of the system, ui is a (control) variable player i can
manipulate, x0 is the arbitrarily chosen initial state of the system, a,b1, and
b2 are constant system parameters, and ˙ x denotes the time derivative of x.









We assume that both qi and rii are positive and bi diﬀers from zero.
We consider in detail the existence of a feedback Nash equilibrium of this
diﬀerential game (see Ba¸ sar and Olsder (1995) for a precise deﬁnition of this
equilibrium concept). Closely related to this problem are the following set of
coupled algebraic Riccati equations (ARE):
−ak1 − k1a − q1 + k1s1k1 + k1s2k2 + k2s2k1 = 0; (2)
−ak2 − k2a − q2 + k2s2k2 + k2s1k1 + k1s1k2 = 0; (3)
where si := bir
−1
ii bi.
From Ba¸ sar and Olsder (1995, proposition 6.8), we have:
Theorem 1: Let ¯ ki ≥ 0 solve the set of Riccati equations.
Then the pair of strategies given by
ui = −r
−1
ii bi¯ kix (4)
i = 1,2, provide a feedback Nash equilibrium, leading to the cost Ji(u1,u2) :=
x0¯ kix0, for player i.
Moreover, the resulting system dynamics described by ˙ x = aclx; x(0) = x0,
with acl := a − s1 ¯ k1 − s2 ¯ k2, is asymptotically stable. ￿In fact, one can immediately deduce from Weeren (1995, p.96) that when
the players are restricted at the outset to memoryless strategies (cf. Lukes
(1971)) then existence of a positive solution to the above scalar Riccati equa-
tions is a both necessary and suﬃcient condition for existence of a feedback
Nash equilibrium.
Weeren et al. (1999) showed that the above set of algebraic Riccati equations
(ARE) either has one or three positive solutions. In this paper we study the
conditions on the system parameters under which these diﬀerent situations
occur. Furthermore, in case there are three equilibria, we compare these re-
garding stability and aggregate eﬃciency in order to reach a singleton-valued
reﬁnement of this equilibrium concept.
II. Characterization of the number of equilibria
To study the intersection points of the (ARE) equations we introduce (for
notational convenience) the variables:
σi := siqi and κi := siki, i = 1,2.
Using this notation (2,3) can be rewritten as
−2aκ1 − σ1 + κ
2
1 + 2κ1κ2 = 0; (5)
−2aκ2 − σ2 + κ
2
2 + 2κ2κ1 = 0. (6)
The above question can therefore be reformulated as under which conditions
the two hyperbola



















intersect in the ﬁrst quadrant of the (κ1,κ2)-plane.
To visualize the situation, we sketched in ﬁgure 1 the hyperbola (7) and (8),
respectively.
From (5) we have that κ2 =
2aκ1+σ1−κ2
1
2κ1 . Substitution of this into (6) shows




















Figure 1: The hyperbola in case a = 2,σ1 = 1,σ2 = 1
2
From this equation it is immediately clear that the set of (ARE) equations
has at most four solutions. A more detailed analysis of this equation shows
that
Theorem 2: (ARE) has exact 1 solution in the ﬁrst quadrant if and only
if the system parameters satisfy either one of the following two conditions:
a ≤ 0 (10)
3((a




2 + σ1 + σ2)
3 > 0. (11)
In all other cases, (ARE) has three solutions in the ﬁrst quadrant. ￿













2 − 2σ1 + 4σ2)x.
So, the stationary points of f are
I) if a2 − 2σ2 + σ1 < 0: x1 = 0





a2 − 2σ2 + σ1 and





a2 − 2σ2 + σ1.In case I) it is clear that f can only have one positive zero.
In case II) things are somewhat more complicated. To analyze this case,
ﬁrst consider the situation that x3 ≤ 0 or, equivalently, either a ≤ 0 or
2a2 + 2σ2 − σ1 ≤ 0 and a > 0. Elementary analysis shows then that f has
one positive zero again. In case x3 > 0 it is easily veriﬁed that f has exact
one positive zero if and only if the product f(x2)f(x3) > 0. Elementary cal-






1)2 + 4a2(σ1 − 2σ2)(σ1 + σ2)(2σ1 − σ2) (i). Consequently f(x2)f(x3) > 0 if
and only if (11) holds. So, (ARE) has exactly one solution if either 1) a ≤ 0;
2) a2 − 2σ2 + σ1 ≤ 0; 3) 2a2 + 2σ2 − σ1 ≤ 0 or 4) (11) holds.
Next we show that if either condition 2) or 3) is satisﬁed condition 4) also
holds. To that end we rewrite σ2 as σ2 =
σ1+a2
2 +µ for some positive µ. Sub-
stitution of this expression into (i) yields 27{1
4(a4 − σ2
1) + a2µ}2 + 9
2µ2(σ2
1 −
a4)+14a2µ3+3µ4 . Now, if a4−σ2





2µ2a4 ≥ 0. So, (i) is positive. On the other hand, if a4 − σ2
1 < 0,
it is obvious that (i) is positive too, which proves the claim. In a similar
way one can show that 4) holds in case 3) is satisﬁed by rewriting σ1 as
σ1 = 2a2 + 2σ2 + µ, for some positive µ. ￿
To get an impression how the parameter surface satisfying (11) (for a > 0)
looks like we use the reparametrization σi = a2τi. For a ﬁxed a we visualized
this set, 3((1 + τ1 + τ2)2 − 3τ1τ2)2 − 4(1 + τ1 + τ2)3 > 0, in ﬁgure 2.







Figure 2: = : Set where 3((1 + τ1 + τ2)2 − 3τ1τ2)2 − 4(1 + τ1 + τ2)3 ≥ 0.
We conclude this section by stressing the factCorollary 3: If the system parameters do not satisfy any of the conditions
mentioned in theorem 2, the diﬀerential game has at least three feedback
Nash solutions. ￿
III. Stability of solutions
A natural question that arises in case none of the conditions of theorem
2 is satisﬁed is whether it is possible to formulate some (natural) additional
requirement on the feedback Nash solution that is satisﬁed by only one of
the solutions. In Weeren et al. (1999) this issue was also raised, and it is
shown that the additional requirement of dynamic stability of the solutions
is not a suﬃcient criterion to eliminate this nonuniqueness. If there are three
equilibria, see Figure 2, the smallest and largest equilibrium (in terms of κ1)
are stable equilibria whereas the remaining equilibrium is a saddle-point. An
interesting point, that is not elaborated in the above mentioned paper but
which is easily veriﬁed, is that in the symmetric case, σ1 = σ2, the origin
(0,0) is located on a saddle-path. This suggests that, on the one hand, one
can expect computational diﬃculties in ﬁnding the appropriate equilibrium
in a ﬁnite planning horizon setting with no penalties on the ﬁnal state. On
the other hand, one can conclude that the equilibrium outcomes of the game
will depend in that case crucially on the assumptions how to penalize out-
comes of the ﬁnal state of the game.
Next, we consider the closed-loop stability of the solutions as a criterion to
eliminate nonuniqueness. Our ﬁrst result is
Theorem 4: Assume that σ1 6= σ2.
Then the closed-loop ”matrix” acl diﬀers for all solutions.
Moreover, in case (ARE) has three diﬀerent solutions (k1,k2), (l1,l2) and
(m1,m2), with (without loss of generality) k1 < l1 < m1, then the smallest
closed-loop matrix is attained by either (k1,k2) or (m1,m2).
Proof: From theorem 1 we have that if (k1,k2) solve (ARE), the correspond-
ing closed-loop matrix acl equals a−s1k1−s2k2 or, equivalently, a−κ1−κ2.
Using this we note that (5,6) can be rewritten as
2aclκ1 + σ1 + κ
2
1 = 0; (13)
2aclκ2 + σ2 + κ
2
2 = 0. (14)Now assume, both the two diﬀerent solutions (k1,k2) and (l1,l2) satisfy the
above equation yielding the same closed-loop matrix acl. From (13) we then
get:
2aclk1 + σ1 + k
2
1 = 0 and 2acll1 + σ1 + l
2
1 = 0.
Subtracting these two equations yields: 2acl(k1 − l1) + (k2
1 − l2
1) = 0. Since
k1 6= l1 we conclude that 2acl = −(k1 + l1). Substituting this into (13) gives
−(k1 + l1)k1 = −σ1 − k2
1 or, equivalently, k1l1 = σ1. Similarly, one can
show that under these assumptions also the equality k2l2 = σ2 must hold.
Furthermore, by assumption acl = a−k1−k2 = a−l1−l2. So, k1+k2 = l1+l2.






= k1 + k2. (15)








Addition of (15) and (16) yields k1k2 = σ2 (i), whereas subtraction of them
gives rise to the equality k1k2 = σ1 (ii). Comparing (i) and (ii) we conclude
that the equality σ1 = σ2 must hold, which violates our assumption. So, our
assumption that both solutions yield the same closed-loop system must be
wrong, which completes the ﬁrst part of the proof.
To prove the second part of the theorem, we ﬁrst note that all three solutions
lie on the hyperbola (7). Note that on the interval [k1,m1] this hyperbola
is a convex linesegment. It is easily seen that the maximum of the function
g(κ1,κ2) deﬁned by g(κ1,κ2) := κ1+κ2 on this convex linesegment is attained
at either one of the endpoints of the segment. Since both closed-loop matrices
do not coincide (as we proved above), this shows that the minimum value of
acl = a−κ1−κ2 is attained at either one of the points (k1,k2) or (m1,m2). ￿
Next, consider the symmetric case, i.e. σ1 = σ2. Obviously, when this con-
dition holds then, whenever (k1,k2) satisﬁes (ARE) also (k2,k1) solves these
equations (see e.g. (13,14)). In particular the symmetric solution (k,k) is
obtained for k = a+
√
a2+3σ
3 . With respect to the corresponding closed-loop
systems we have the following
Theorem 5: Let σ1 = σ2. Assume that (ARE) has three diﬀerent solutions.Then the closed-loop systems of both non-symmetric solutions coincide. More-
over, the closed-loop matrix acl of the non-symmetric solution is smaller than
that of the symmetric solution.
Proof: First we consider the closed-loop system of the non-symmetric so-
lutions.
Subtracting (14) from (13) yields the equality 2acl(κ1 − κ2) = −(κ2
1 − κ2
2).
Since we assume that κ1 6= κ2, we obtain from this equality that 2acl =
−(κ1 + κ2). Using the deﬁnition of acl = a − κ1 − κ2, we conclude that
2a = κ1 + κ2. Substitution of this into acl shows that acl = −a (note that
a > 0 since we assumed that (ARE) has three diﬀerent solutions!). Note
that this result does not depend on the speciﬁc structure of the asymmetric
solution. So, we conclude that the closed-loop matrix for both asymmetric
solutions equals −a.
To prove the second statement of the theorem, we calculate the closed-loop
matrix of the system resulting from the symmetric solution (k,k), which we




a2 + 3σ). Since by assumption (ARE) has three diﬀerent solutions, it
follows immediately from theorem 2 that a2 > σ. Using this, elementary cal-
culations show then that acl(k1,k2) < acl(k,k). Which completes the proof.
￿
From theorems 4 and 5 we conclude that closed-loop stability is also not
a suﬃcient criterium to eliminate nonuniqueness completely. In the symmet-
ric case (σ1 = σ2) things go wrong. On the other hand, we observe that
always either at the smallest or largest equilibrium (in terms of κ1) the most
stable closed-loop system is achieved.
Finally, we consider minimum of total cost incurred by both players in the
equilibrium as a criterion to eliminate non-uniqueness. To that end we ﬁrst
note that since the cost incurred by a player is given by Ji = κix2
0, i = 1,2.
Since these equilibrium points lie on one hyperbola, it is clear that never one
of these equilibria will be Pareto eﬃcient (that is both players have lower
cost in an equilibrium compared to those in another equilibrium). We ﬁrst
prove the next lemma
Lemma 6: Both ( ¯ k1, ¯ k2) and ( ¯ k2, ¯ k1) are equilibria of the game if and only if
σ1 = σ2.Proof: Assume that both points are equilibria of the game. Then from (5)
we have −2a ¯ k1 − σ1 + ¯ k1
2 + 2 ¯ k1 ¯ k2 = 0 and from (6) we have −2a ¯ k1 − σ2 +
¯ k1
2 + 2 ¯ k1 ¯ k2 = 0. Subtracting both equations yields then σ1 = σ2. The other
implication was already noted before. ￿
Now, assume σ1 6= σ2. Subtracting (5) from (6) yields
−2a(κ1 − κ2) − σ1 + σ2 + (κ1 − κ2)(κ1 + κ2) = 0.
or, stated diﬀerently,




If both (k1,k2) and ( ¯ k1, ¯ k2) are two diﬀerent equilibria yielding the same to-
tal cost, i.e. (k1 + k2)x2
0 = ( ¯ k1 + ¯ k2)x2
0 (i), it follows then straightforwardly
from (17) that also k1 − k2 = ¯ k1 − ¯ k2 (ii) should hold. Obviously (i) and (ii)
together imply that k1 = ¯ k1 and k2 = ¯ k2, which contradicts the assumption
that both equilibria diﬀer. In case σ1 = σ2, it is clear from the proof of
theorem 5 that total cost in the smallest and largest equilibrium point are
the same, i.e. 2ax2
0. Furthermore elementary calculation shows that in the




0. Since σ < a2
(see theorem 2), total cost are in this equilibrium point always smaller than
2ax2
0. This yields
Theorem 7: If σ1 6= σ2 then total cost diﬀer in all equilibria.
If σ1 = σ2 then total cost are minimized in the symmetric equilibrium point.
￿
So we conclude that the additional requirement, that amongst all equilib-
ria we look for an equilibrium which minimizes total cost, always gives rise
to a unique equilibrium.
IV. Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied feedback Nash equilibria in the two-player linear
quadratic scalar diﬀerential game. We showed that the corresponding set of
algebraic Riccati equations has either one or three diﬀerent solutions in theﬁrst quadrant and we gave necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the system
parameters for existence of a unique solution of these equations.
In order to be able to discriminate between diﬀerent equilibria we considered
three singleton-valued reﬁnements of this equilibrium concept: dynamic sta-
bility, stability of the closed-loop system and aggregate eﬃciency.
We noted that always the smallest and largest solution (measured w.r.t. κ1)
are dynamically stable and the other equilibrium is a saddle point. Further-
more we pointed out that if σ1 = σ2 the origin is situated on a saddle path.
With respect to closed-loop stabilization we saw that either the largest or
smallest solution will stabilize the system most. In case σ1 = σ2 closed-
stability at the largest and smallest equilibrium point is the same. So in
that case, using this criterion, we still have non-uniqueness. If one uses the
additional requirement to choose that equilibrium for which the sum of the
cost of both players is minimal we showed that always a unique equilibrium
results. In particular we saw that if σ1 = σ2 the minimal cost are attained in
the symmetric equilibrium. However, as we already noted, this equilibrium
point is dynamically unstable and its closed-loop stability is worse than in
the other equilibria. So, deﬁnite answers on which equilibrium one should
choose seem to be diﬃcult in that situation.
The obtained results may be helpfull in analyzing problems in the area of
environmental economics and macro-economic policy coordination problems
where this framework is a very natural one to model problems (see e.g. En-
gwerda (1998) for references). Furthermore, we hope that the obtained re-
sults may be helpfull in analyzing the more general multi-player and multi-
dimensional case.
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